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1 
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Abstract 
Domestic climate policy emissions trading schemes appear to be spreading all over the word. Howev-
er, carbon markets in existence often suffer from dilution in terms of ecological effectiveness, eco-
nomic efficiency, and social justice. Thus, in order to firmly base carbon markets on the main pillars 
of Sustainable Development, this paper defines the criteria of ecological effectiveness, economic effi-
ciency and social justice and operationalizes them for giving design recommendations for sustainable 
carbon markets. Methodologically, the paper uses welfare and institutional economics, jurisprudential 
reasoning, and modern climate justice thinking in order to discuss the three criteria. In addition, design 
and implication analysis is applied in order to develop design recommendations for sustainable carbon 
markets. By doing so, the paper provides evaluation criteria for emissions trading schemes in existence 
and in planning, but also allows for improvements in order to make emissions trading a valuable in-
strument of a sustainable global climate policy. 
Keywords: sustainability, emissions trading, climate policy, justice, efficiency, effectiveness 
JEL-code: D62, D63, Q48, Q54, Q58 
1 Introduction 
Although environmental economists have intensively analyzed tradable emission rights since the in-
vention of the instrument by Dales (1968), have emphasized its merits in terms of ecological effec-
tiveness and economic efficiency (Tietenberg 2006), and have even proven emissions trading 
scheme’s (ETS) applicability e.g. in traditional clean air policy in the USA (Ellerman 2000, OECD 
2004), it took until 1997 to introduce this instrument in climate policy. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 
allows the use of flexible mechanisms such as International Emissions Trading (IET) (Art. 17 KP), 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Art. 12 KP) and Joint Implementation (JI) (Art. 6 KP). Nev-
ertheless, besides earlier experiments in EU member states such as Denmark and the UK, the EU ETS 
of 2005 was the first supranational carbon market aiming at substantially reducing emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and lowering compliance costs. However, the results were ambiguous (Ellerman et al. 
2010): The pilot phase (2005-2007) had almost no ecological effect, the carbon market suffered from 
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tions for effective, efficient, and just ETS are developed (3). Ultimately, the results are summarized 
and existing ETS are briefly evaluated on the basis of the sustainability criteria for ETS (4). 
2 Criteria for and Design Features of ETS 
2.1 Design Features 
Basically, as proposed by Dales (1968), the decisions to be made when cap-and-trade policies are im-
plemented are twofold; other authors add a third dimension (Rudolph/Jahnke/Galevska 2005: 563f): 
·  overall amount of allowed emissions (cap) 
·  initial allocation of emission allowances (distribute) 
·  framework of the secondary market (trade) 
In order to further differentiate these dimensions for the implementation of ETS in real-world climate 
politics, the following design features apply (Sterk et al. 2006, Roßnagel/Hentschel/Bebenroth 2008): 
·  coverage and bindingness 
o  pollutants 
o  emitters (incl. upstream vs. downstream) 
o  bindingness (binding vs. voluntary) 
·  cap 
o  total amount of emissions (incl. absolute volume vs. specific intensity targets) 
o  dynamics of the cap (depreciation of allowances, reduction of cap size) 
·  initial allocation and validity of the allowances 
o  free of charge (grandfathering, benchmarking) vs. for purchase (auction, fixed price) 
o  banking and borrowing 
o  offsets (domestic, international) 
·  trading system 
o  compliance periods 
o  marketplace 
o  market interventions (safety valve, price limits etc.) 
·  monitoring and penalties 
o  monitoring, reporting, verification (MRV) 
o  registries (allowances, emissions) 
o  penalties 
·  Additional Measures 
In order to implement sustainable ETS these design features have to be adjusted to the following basic 
criteria of ecological effectiveness, economic efficiency, and social justice.   5 
 
2.2 Criteria 
2.2.1 Ecological Effectiveness 
Theoretical as well as empirical studies on ETS (Michaelis 1996, Rudolph 2005, Tietenberg 2006; 
Ellerman 2010, OECD 2004) point to the importance of the following environmental effects of trada-
ble pollution rights already emphasized by Dales (1968: 801ff): 
·  accuracy in reaching the target 
·  means to adapt to structural changes (increased environmental risk, economic growth etc.) 
·  incentives to innovate 
·  carbon leakage 
First and foremost, once the environmental target of ETS including the corresponding total number of 
emission allowances is politically determined and emitters are obliged to hold an emission allowance 
for each and every unit of emissions, the overall environmental target is met with utmost accuracy, 
given monitoring is perfect. Contrary to environmental taxes, which represent a price control market-
based instrument, ETS are quantity control instruments, in as much as the government decides about 
the total amount of emissions allowed. 
In addition to ETS’ accuracy, if necessary (e.g. due to higher environmental risks), the total quantity of 
emission allowances could be easily changed by the government either by depreciating the value of 
allowances over time, by buying allowances from the market, or by simply handing out fewer allow-
ances in the next round of initial allocation. Anyway, after the readjustment of the total amount of 
allowances, again the new target will be met accurately without any delays. In the case of an increase 
in demand (e.g. due to economic growth), for environmental reasons, there is no need to revise the 
ETS, because the overall supply of emission rights has been fixed ex ante. 
Cap-and-trade systems just as any market-based policy instrument and contrary to command-and-
control set permanent incentives to innovate. As emitters have to pay for each and every unit of emis-
sions, developing and using a more cost-efficient abatement technology not only saves them emission 
reduction costs, but also allows them to sell surplus emission allowances and make extra profits. 
Ultimately, ambitious domestic climate policy including ETS may cause carbon leakage, if competing 
countries induce lower carbon costs on emitters. Production sites may then be moved to the new host 
country and emissions may even increase globally, if the new host has less stringent policies in place. 
2.2.2 Economic Efficiency 
In terms of efficiency, tradable permits follow the Standard-Price-Approach (Baumol/Oates 1971), 
thus inheriting its main economic characteristics (Rudolph 2005, Tietenberg 2006, Endres 2007): 
·  company-level efficiency 6 
 
·  society-level efficiency 
·  attribution of costs 
·  administrative costs 
·  transaction costs 
·  property rights 
·  competition 
Company level efficiency is achieved by allowing emitters to choose their individual optimal level of 
emissions by matching marginal abatement costs and the allowance price, the latter being determined 
by supply and demand on the allowance market. 
Due to a unique price signal from a competitive market and the matching of the market price with 
marginal abatement costs by each and every polluter, marginal abatement costs are equalized across all 
polluters, which in turn characterizes the efficient allocation of abatement efforts and emission rights 
across the economy. In this way, environmental target can be reached at lowest cost to society. 
At the individual firm level, market-based instruments make the polluter pay not only for abatement – 
as is the case in command-and-control regimes –, but also for the remaining part of the emissions. For 
every emission unit caused, polluters have to acquire an emission allowance and pay its price. How-
ever, the additional burden to polluters depends on the initial allocation scheme. If allowances are 
sold, a real extra burden emerges; if allowances are handed out free of charge, there is no such burden. 
In the former case, however, the revenues can be used for redistributive purposes or for lowering dis-
tortional taxes in order to create a double dividend (Bovenberg 1999). 
In terms of administrative costs, being the costs that governments have to bear when implementing 
environmental policies, theoretically ETS lowers the burden compared to command-and-control poli-
cies, because – in addition to monitoring measures – the administrative body only has to fix the total 
amount of emissions and distribute the allowances. Individual approval of facilities and abatement 
technologies would be redundant. 
Transaction costs, which arise when property rights are transferred, lower the trade volume of allow-
ances and thus can lead to efficiency losses (Stavins 1995). However, transaction costs can be kept to 
a minimum if allowances are traded on established markets or brokered by experienced agents and if 
additional approval requirements for individual allowance transactions do not apply. 
In terms of property rights (Bromley 1991), property can be based either on natural rights (Locke) or 
on a social contract (Kant), whereat the first only allows expropriation if compensation applies, while 
in the latter case a societal consensus can change property regimes, e.g. if former free emission rights 
are auctioned off under ETS. By fixing a total allowable amount of emissions, ETS, as a first step, 
transforms open access to natural resources into state property. Afterward, by handing out emission 
allowances, state property is transformed into private property. Thus, ETS, as Bromley (1991) and 7 
 
Daly (1999) demanded, separates the decision about the total scale of the economic subsystem from 
the distributional and the allocation decisions. In this way, also, only patrimonium, the right to use the 
resource (usus, usus fructus), is granted to emitters, while dominium is not, because the government 
prevents abusus by limiting the total amount of emission rights. 
Competitive distortions can occur on emission allowance markets, if the underlying market (e.g. the 
electricity market) is imperfect; however these problems have to be dealt with at the level of the under-
lying market. Serious competitive distortions could also be induced by free-of-charge initial allocation 
schemes, and have to be dealt with by the issuing authority. In addition, market participants could 
stockpile emission allowances. If allowances are hoarded for future use or arbitrage profits, no distor-
tion would occur. If, however, allowances are kept in stock in order to prohibit competitors’ market 
entry, this would signify a serious competitive distortion. However, such kind of distortions is unlikely 
due to individual profit maximization, and they can be kept to a minimum by market surveillance au-
thorities. Ultimately, higher carbon costs induced by ambitious domestic climate policies may lower 
this country’s competitiveness on the world market and lead to leakage of production sites and jobs. 
2.2.3 Social Justice 
Contrary to the well-defined criteria of ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency, the criterion 
of social justice and especially its targets are controversially debated and rather insufficiently defined. 
It is even questioned if justice can be defined in abstract terms, or if justice is rather a concept of com-
peting claims and case-by-case negotiations about a fair outcome, while others argue that even claims 
can be logically discriminated against and priorities can be defined without ethically discriminating 
against individuals. Anyway, as climate change strongly influences the livelihood of current and future 
generations, ETS distributes entitlements to use the commonly owned atmosphere. At the moment, 
these distributional decisions are not based on historic responsibilities for climate change. Therefore, it 
has to be considered how a just distribution can be achieved i.e. in which way different claims can be 
respected. In this context, the following concepts of social justice are important (Helmstädter 1997, 
Krebs 2000, Lerch 2003): 
·  procedural justice vs. the result of distributive justice  
·  justice in transfer and acquisition, justice within allocation and redistributive justice  
·  desert-based justice and welfare-based justice  
·  egalitarianism vs. non-egalitarianism 
·  inter- vs. intra-generational justice 
Procedural justice assumes that only the procedures and rules of social processes can be just, while the 
result of distributive justice refers to fair outcomes of social processes. Critics state that the orientation 
towards the result of distributive justice implies presumptuousness with respect to the availability of 
knowledge (Nozick 1974, Hayek 1996). However, using some notion of the result of distributive jus-8 
 
tice is indispensable already on theoretical grounds, and studies from economic psychology show that 
individuals base their economic decisions on result-based concepts of fairness (Kahne-
mann/Knetsch/Thaler 1986). Thus, especially in the context of economic decision making, some con-
cept respecting the results of a distribution is inevitable, whereat justice in transfer and acquisition, 
justice within allocation and redistributive justice (Helmstädter 1997) can be distinguished. 
Justice in transfer and acquisition demands that an effort is compensated by an equivalent service, a 
requirement that is inherently fulfilled by ETS. Justice within allocation, in contrast, asks for a fair 
distribution of goods according to individual claims. Redistributive justice, however, refers to a fair 
outcome of a redistributive procedure subsequent to the market allocation. If these concepts are ac-
cepted, the question arises, what the criteria for the distribution are. 
Welfare-based justice asks for a fair distribution based on the needs of individuals. If desert-based 
justice is applied, however, the distribution of goods is fair, if it is based on the share individuals have 
contributed to the goods’ production. But desert-based justice is faced with problems of measurement, 
e.g. because effort can be measured in input or output terms. In addition, with respect to questions of 
access to natural resources, the concept of desert-based justice has its limits, because even if the ap-
propriation of natural resources is legitimized by mixing natural service with human labor, still, a rele-
vant part of the result is provided by nature. A combination of desert-based and welfare-based justice 
implicitly proposed by Marx (1972) – “from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs” – is heavily criticized by economists, because this mixture does not set the right incentives. 
Rawls (1971), however, proposed a combination of thee two concepts, which is still considered to be a 
groundbreaking contribution to the theory of justice and the discussion on equality. 
In the “why equality”-debate (Krebs 2000) it is argued that, firstly, egalitarianism confuses equality 
being a goal of justice with it being a byproduct of justice; secondly, equality may have inhumane 
consequences; thirdly, equality underestimate the complexity of the concept of justice; and fourthly, 
equality is simply not feasible. As an alternative to equality, inviolable standards such as human digni-
ty have to apply. Nevertheless, while equality cannot be considered as the sole criterion for justice and 
it most certainly has to be accompanied by minimum standards, preferring equality to inequality seems 
likely (Ott/Döring 2004). But even if equality is accepted, the “equality of what”-question arises. Ref-
erence points proposed in the literature are e.g. preferences and talents not under individual control 
(Sen), basic rights (Nozick), income (Daly). While a naïve notion of equality in terms of equal welfare 
for everybody seems rather inadequate, Rawls (1971) suggested aiming at equality in terms of rights 
and freedom as well as chances and opportunities, while inequalities can be accepted for income and 
capital, if, and only if they deliver the highest benefit to the poorest, and if offices and positions are 
equally open to everybody (difference principle). 
Ultimately, questions of intra- and intergenerational justice are relevant. The Brundtland Report 
(WCED 1987) emphasized that the needs of current as well as the needs of future generations should 9 
 
be taken into account. While intra-generational justice refers to the distribution within one generation 
– e.g. on the national (rich vs. poor citizens) or international (industrialized vs. less developed coun-
tries) level – inter-generational justice accounts for differences between present and future generations. 
3 Design requirements for effective, efficient and just ETS 
In order to establish sustainable carbon markets that reach climate protection targets reliably at mini-
mum cost to society and without major detrimental distributional effects, ETS have to be designed in a 
way that accounts for the above defined criteria. Considering the specific design features of ETS, the 
following recommendations can be given (Heister/Michaelis 1990, Boemare/Quirion 2002, Ott/Sachs 
2002, Butzengeiger/Betz/Bode 2001, WBGU 2009, Fankhauser/Hepburn 2010, Harris 2010). 
3.1 Coverage and Bindingness 
Sustainable carbon markets should cover pollutants and emitters comprehensively but downstream, 
oblige participants to engage in climate protection, include opt-in provisions while excluding opt-out 
options for the following reasons. 
As efficiency gains are the biggest when marginal abatement costs differ greatly amongst pollutants, 
coverage should include all pollutants. In addition, the share of scarcity costs charged to the originator 
of emissions is the biggest if coverage is comprehensive. Also from a competition perspective cover-
age should be comprehensive, in order to establish an efficient market and prevent thin markets, which 
might lead to efficiency losses. From an ecological perspective, covering all pollutants allows for the 
biggest environmental effects, because all emissions are capped. While CO2 is the major GHG in 
terms of overall global warming effects, other GHG have a stronger impact per unit and their emis-
sions are also increasing. Thus, all GHG should be included in a carbon market, whereat non-CO2 
effects can be calculated on the base of Global Warming Potentials (GWP). However, if monitoring 
cannot be guaranteed for some pollutants (e.g. non-CO2 GHG), if administrative costs of greater cov-
erage exceed potential efficiency gains, or if there are already regulations in place, these pollutants 
might be excluded. In this case, coverage should be focused on the most potential pollutants in terms 
of overall global warming effects (e.g. CO2) in order to maximize ecological effects and optimize on 
abatement and administrative costs, while pollutants with only a small contribution to global climate 
change might be excluded; but again, the specification of criteria for exclusion increase administrative 
costs. From a justice perspective, also, coverage should be comprehensive, because only this would 
fulfill the equality and the polluter-pays criteria – here, the application of the polluter-pays principle as 
a criterion for social justice allows for taking into account historic responsibilities and therefore as-
sures that desert-based justice is kept in mind. If only selected GHG would be covered, emitters of 
these covered gases would be discriminated against those who only emit other GHG but are also re-
sponsible  for  detrimental  climate  effects.  CO2eq  should  be  used  to  include  non-CO2  GHG.  Even 10 
 
though the social context of emissions is veiled by CO2eq, procedural justice calls for CO2eq, because 
distinct natural scientific criteria are applied and only CO2eq would enable the ETS to treat all GHG 
equally. Nevertheless, there might be reasons to exclude some GHG either because they cannot be 
reliably monitored, which would violate the polluter-pays principle as well as the inter-generational-
justice criterion, or unjustifiable competitive disadvantages would arise. While in the latter case, inter-
generational justice would call for full coverage, intra-generational justice may justify exemptions. 
In terms of emitters of GHG, the same economic, ecological, and justice arguments apply, making 
comprehensive coverage, independent of size, emissions, costs etc., most beneficial. 
As a consequence, from the viewpoint of effectiveness and justice, upstream ETS, in which emissions 
are covered at the level of entrance into the economic system (e.g. fossil fuel producers or importers), 
appear to be preferable to downstream approaches, where emissions are covered at the point of actual 
emissions (e.g. utilities), because upstream ETS account for up to 100% of total emissions, while 
downstream ETS usually only cover about 50%. In addition, as upstream ETS are easier to monitor 
due to the smaller amount for sources, ecological targets can be reached more accurately, which also 
fosters inter-generational justice, and the polluter-pays principle is fulfilled to a larger extent. Howev-
er, due to upstream system’s usually smaller amount of market participants, from an economics’ pers-
pective, downstream ETS appear to be preferable for competition reasons, because they provide a 
more liquid carbon market. On the other hand, administrative costs might be lower in the case of up-
stream ETS, because fewer sources have to be monitored. If both approaches are combined, however, 
double burdens may arise, if some emitters face direct, downstream-induced emission costs and up-
stream-increased fuel prices. In order to achieve an efficient allocation, double burdens have to be 
avoided, because they distort the price signal; however, prevention measures make the system more 
complex and thus increase administrative costs. Altogether, while upstream ETS is advisable from an 
ecological  and  justice  perspective,  economics  would  recommend  a  downstream  approach;  thus  a 
downstream system with broad coverage could be a compromise. 
Participation has to be binding for covered sources. From an economics’ perspective, in the absence of 
additional participation incentives, only allowance-sellers with low marginal abatement costs would 
participate in the carbon market, because only they expect profits from selling surplus emission rights 
why others expect an increase in costs. This would create a market with supply but without demand 
for allowances and thus prevent an efficient allocation. If in the case of voluntary participation addi-
tional incentives for potential participants are provided, these kinds of subsidies tend to increase the 
financial burden for the government, create competitive distortions, and thus lead to welfare losses. 
Also, only a binding ETS allows for charging additional emission costs to the physical originator of 
emissions, because in a voluntary system additional costs would be shunned. Ultimately, competitive 
distortions could only be prevented by compulsory participation of all emitters. From an environmen-
tal perspective, voluntary ETS tend to have less stringent targets (e.g. specific individual intensity 11 
 
targets), in order to give potential participants an incentive to take part. In addition, penalties are less 
feasible, because emitters would avoid them by not participating. Binding systems, however, on the 
other, can be used to implement ambitious targets that would be achieved accurately, because emitters 
are obliged to engage in climate protection and can be heavily penalized if they don’t. From a justice 
perspective, only binding participation would guarantee compliance and thus be in line with inter-
generational justice. Also, according to the polluter-pays principle, emitters must bear the costs of 
emissions. Ultimately, following the equality criterion, all emitters must be treated in the same way 
and thus have to participate on the same terms. 
If ETS are already implemented, opt-out options allow emitters to withdraw from participation ex 
post, while opt-in provisions enable emitters to enter into an existing ETS after its introduction. If in 
the case of opt-outs emitters are not covered by comparable policies, losses in ecological effectiveness, 
economic efficiency, and social justice of ETS would occur, because the same arguments as in the 
case of voluntary participation apply. On the other hand, opt-ins may increase coverage and thus lead 
to a more efficient, effective, and just ETS. In the latter case, however, the cap and other design fea-
tures have to be readjusted to the new coverage, which, in turn, might increase administrative costs. 
3.2 Cap 
Sustainable carbon markets should implement an absolute volume cap that is based on the ecological 
need of restricting climate change to +2°C, introduces scarcity and considers the needs of current and 
future generations according to the “Contraction & Convergence” concept. 
While the optimal level of pollution is impossible to determine exactly by economics (Baumol/Oates 
1971), cost-benefit-analysis can help approximating a reasonable level (Stern 2007). In any case, the 
politically given environmental target asked for by Baumol/Oates (1971) and thus the cap has to create 
scarcity in order to implement a price signal for individual emitters’ internal emission level optimiza-
tion. Greater scarcity increases the incentives to innovate and to develop more efficient production and 
abatement technology. By fixing an adequate cap size, also, the open access resource is transformed 
into state property and the scale decision is made independent of distribution and allocation, allowing 
the government to prevent abusus of the resource (patrimonium). In addition, other criteria such as 
environmental necessities or fairness criteria can be used, thus lowering decision-making costs. From 
an ecological point of view, the cap must be in line with the needs for global climate protection, e.g. 
keeping the average global temperature below +2°C compared to the pre-industrial level. Total allow-
able emissions can then be easily calculated in absolute volume terms. By using the Budget-Approach 
(WBGU 2009), a total allowable amount of emissions of 1,100 billion tons of CO2eq for the period of 
1990 to 2050 can be calculated, which, due to emissions in the past, leave only 600 billion tons of 
emissions for the period 2010 to 2050. If then for justice reasons (equality, polluter-pays principle) 
equal rights to use natural resources for each and every person all over the world are accepted, national 12 
 
emission caps can be derived immediately and even historic responsibilities can be accounted for fol-
lowing the polluter-pays principle. If however, intra- and intergenerational justice should apply, the 
“Contraction & Convergence”-concept (Meyer 2000) appears preferable, in which the total number of 
emission allowances decreases form the status quo to an ecologically acceptable level (contraction), 
and per-capita emissions rights converge (convergence). This would result in a steep decrease in the 
cap sizes of industrialized countries, while less developed countries might even increase their emis-
sions. Anyway, a stringent absolute cap would support inter-generational justice, because future gen-
erations would be safeguarded against dramatic changes in their livelihood. However, all too stringent 
caps may interfere with intra-generational justice, e.g. because due to regressive distributional effects 
of higher energy prices poorer households are faced with comparably high burdens. Again, the “Con-
traction & Convergence”-proposal would, at least to a good extent, take account of those restrictions. 
When specifying the target, intensity targets (e.g. emissions per product or per unit GDP) cannot guar-
antee compliance with an overall reduction target, because economic growth and output increases may 
increase total emissions. Thus, only absolute volume targets allow for ecological accuracy and inter-
generational justice, because the overall amount of acceptable emissions is fixed ex ante and future 
generations are protected to a certain amount. Also, in economic terms, absolute volume allowances 
can be more easily made marketable than reduction credits, thus saving administrative costs. 
Changing the cap size over time might be necessary from an ecological, economic, and justice point of 
view. A reduction of the overall cap size or a devaluation of the allowances over time (e.g. 2% per 
year) might be reasonable e.g. in order to countervail the decreasing incentive to innovate in the case 
of ongoing emission reductions, allowance sales, and resulting price decreases. This would also im-
prove government’s ability to countervail abusus of the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb emissions 
revising its scale decision. In addition, moving slowly but steadily from status quo emissions to the 
target level may lower transformation costs for emitters and minimize detrimental distributional ef-
fects in terms of intra-generational justice. While cap size changes are legitimate, if property is defined 
by a social contract, anyway, these changes should be decided upon in advance, in order to give emit-
ters planning reliability. In addition to cap size changes announced in advance, ex post adjustments to 
new scientific findings e.g. about ecological requirements may be necessary. These, however, should 
be kept to the absolute minimum, because they have negative economic and distributional effects such 
as price fluctuations, depreciation of property rights, etc. 
3.3 Initial Allocation and Validity of the Allowances 
Sustainable carbon markets should auction off emissions allowances and use the revenues for reim-
bursement. Banking should be allowed, while borrowing may cause detrimental effects. Offsets should 
be accepted but limited in quantity and quality. 13 
 
The initial allocation of emission rights is less relevant for the environmental effects of an ETS. As 
long as the overall cap is kept intact and the allocation of additional emission rights to one emitter 
means fewer allowances to other emitters, the environmental accuracy is not endangered. However, if 
changes in the overall amount of emissions rights are suspected to occur due to new scientific findings 
on  ecological  necessities,  auctioning  allows  for  easier  implementation,  because  simply  a  smaller 
amount of allowances has to be offered for sale. Within free of charge allocations, though, where al-
lowances are handed out based on historic emissions or output levels in a base year multiplied by a 
compliance factor, the compliance factor has to be changed, which induces additional administrative 
costs. In addition, auctioning immediately sets incentives to innovate, because the price signal is in-
stantly visible, while if the initial allocation is free of charge, the price signal only develops on the 
secondary market and incentives are postponed. From an economics’ point of view, the transformation 
of state property into private property by the initial allocation should be done by auctions, which can 
be justified on a social contract based notion of property. Also, only auctioning of clearly defined 
property rights to emissions immediately set an optimal scarcity price signal and thus lead to an effi-
cient initial allocation on a competitive carbon market. In a fixed-price sale, initially, an optimal price 
signal can be hardly achieved, because the authority does not know the overall abatement costs, which 
is necessary to determine the optimal price. Thus, a trial-and-error process similar to the one proposed 
by Baumol/Oates (1971) for the tax case has to be used; however temporary efficiency losses are in-
evitable. In the probable event of not setting the optimal price, this will only be reached on the second-
ary market, where allowances are reallocated. Again, this creates uncertainty about the real price and 
at least postpones an efficient allocation of abatement measures and emission rights. The same is true 
in the case of an initial allocation free of charge, while uncertainty is even intensified and administra-
tive costs dramatically increased due to the complexity of the distribution scheme. If benchmarking is 
used, fuel-specific benchmarks constrain emitters when trying to find the optimal abatement strategy, 
because incentives to use a fuel-switch as an abatement option are undermined. In addition, only auc-
tioning implements the strong polluter-pays-principle, while allowances are given out for free, emitters 
only pay abatement costs but not the costs for the remaining emissions. Those are borne by the socie-
ty. The decision about the initial allocation scheme is clearly a distributive one. If allowances are 
handed out free of charge, the scarcity rents introduced by the cap are transferred to the emitters. If the 
emitters are able to pass on the costs to consumers, emitters make extra windfall profits. If, however, 
allowances are sold, at least parts of the scarcity rents remain with the government. The proceeds of 
these sales can be used either for environmental protection, adaptation measures, damage compensa-
tion, re-distributional means, or they can be used to lower distortionary taxes and create a double divi-
dend (Bovenberg 1999), which in turn increases overall efficiency. Administrative costs usually in-
crease dramatically, if other initial allocation schemes than auctioning are used. Fixed-price sales have 
to find the optimal price by time-consuming trial-and-error, while grandfathering-schemes need to 
determine base-year emissions, compliance factors, early action provisions, newcomer reserves etc., 14 
 
and  benchmarking-schemes  need  to  establish  respective  benchmarks  for  clearly  defined  goods  or 
product groups, historic output levels or output forecast with ex post adjustment etc. Ultimately, com-
petitive distortions within the group of incumbents but also between incumbents and newcomers, 
which cause inefficiencies, can only be prevented effectively by auctioning off all allowances. If al-
lowances are given out free of charge, competitive distortions are inevitable. In order to minimize 
them, incumbents and newcomers have to be treated the same. This, however, is almost impossible, 
because grandfathering and benchmarking are based either on past emissions or past outputs, both of 
which newcomers cannot provide. In addition, in the case of grandfathering, early action has to be 
taken into account in order to prevent rewarding the laggards; however, determining the period, for 
which early action is acceptable, must remain a somewhat arbitrary decision. In the case of ben-
chmarking, products and product groups have to be clearly defined, the classification of which is not 
competition-neutral. In addition, newcomers have to use output forecasts and ex post adjustments, 
which may lead to temporary over-allocation of newcomers and under-allocation of incumbents. Thus, 
altogether, auctioning appears to be the far best way of initial allocation. From a justice perspective, 
auctions are preferable, because they follow the strong polluter-pays principle. Also, all emitters are 
treated equally. As auctioning is the most efficient way, it saves money, which can be used for redi-
stribution or adaptation measures and thus foster inter- and intra-generational justice. In addition, auc-
tions raise revenues, which, as proposed in the Sky Trust (Barnes 2001), can be reimbursed to citizens 
on an equal share basis thus following the principle of equal entitlements to natural resources; they can 
be used for adaptation measures in countries that suffer the most from climate change, thus fostering 
intra-generational international justice; or they can be used for other environmental, economic, or so-
cial purposes. However, auctioning may introduce heavy burdens on current emitters and, if costs are 
passed on, to consumers as well. In addition, emitters may be faced with higher burdens if compared 
to emitters in other countries with less stringent climate policies, which may result in carbon leakage. 
Auctioning thus raises questions of intra-generational national and international justice as well as in-
ter-generational justice. Well designed re-distributional schemes for auction revenues as well as pro-
tective measures, however, may address these issues adequately. Also, free-of-charge-schemes may 
cause unjustifiable windfall profits for emitters. Concerning newcomers, they should be treated the 
same way as incumbents in order to fulfill equality and polluter-pays requirements. 
Banking and borrowing, being the saving of early reduction credits for later use (banking) and the 
present use of future reductions (borrowing), from an economics’ perspective both allow for intertem-
poral flexibility and enable emitters to exploit differences in marginal abatement costs and thus optim-
ize abatement over time. In terms of ecological effects, banking allows for early reduction. As global 
climate change is an environmental problem caused by the accumulation of pollution, early emission 
reduction, even if compensated by later increases in emissions, do not cause detrimental effects. Bor-
rowing, however, may lead to a dilution of the stringency of ETS, if credits for future reductions are 
used at present for emission compensation but are not compensated by real reductions in the future. 15 
 
Thus, from an ecological point of view, banking should be allowed while borrowing should not. From 
a justice perspective, while banking does not interfere with social justice, borrowing may violate inter-
generational justice requirements, if real emission reductions are not made in the future. 
Similar to banking and borrowing, offsets, from an economics’ perspective, allow for more flexibility 
and additional abatement options. Offsets enable emitters to exploit differences in marginal abatement 
costs between themselves and emitters that are excluded from ETS due to e.g. geographical (external 
offsets), size, or pollutant restrictions (internal offsets), thus increasing overall efficiency. If, however, 
offsets are accepted, their total amount should be ex ante determined as a part of the overall cap in 
order not to ex post dilute the scarcity price signal of the cap, undermine incentives to innovate, and 
dilute the cap. In any case, including baseline-and-credit-based offsets into a cap-and-trade system 
increases administrative costs, due to the complex calculation of baseline and project emissions, and 
the need to fulfill ambitious quality requirements such as the sustainability of the projects. Also, from 
an ecological point of view, the total amount should be included in the cap and offsets have to fulfill 
stringent sustainability requirements. They have to be additional, verifiable, permanent, and feasible. 
From a justice perspective, offsets may foster technology and money transfers to developing countries, 
thus increasing intra-generational international justice, given that offsets are ambitious and trustwor-
thy. Quantity limits, however, do not have to apply from a social justice perspective, because the pol-
luter-pays principle always fully applies no matter if the emitter pays for his own reductions or if he 
covers the reductions costs of other emitters. 
3.4 Trading System 
Sustainable carbon markets should be based on a smoothly functioning place with equally easy access 
for all emitters. Compliance periods can be long, if interim compliance control is implemented. Mar-
ket interventions, however, should be kept to the absolute minimum. 
From an economics’ point of view, allowances should be traded at a marketplace already established 
in order to minimize set-up costs. As far as possible, trading should be IT-based. Stock exchange trad-
ing as well as direct bilateral or brokered trading should be possible, because they can help in bringing 
together supply and demand of allowances thus lowering search costs (Stavins 1995: 145f). Additional 
state approval for transactions should be avoided in order to keep transaction costs down, while com-
petition authorities should overlook the emissions market. Ultimately, as well from an economics’ as 
from a social justice perspective, the market should be easily and equally accessible for all emitters in 
order to follow the equality principle and prevent competitive distortions and an increase in transaction 
costs. Other social justice and environmental issues, however, are of only minor importance. 
Compliance periods mainly depend on the ecological targets, while from an economics’ perspective, 
longer compliance periods allow for extra options for inter-temporal cost-minimization, from an envi-
ronmental and social justice point of view, shorter compliance periods are preferable, because they 16 
 
allow for short-term, immediate control over reduction achievements and thus enhance ecological 
effectiveness and foster inter-generational justice. A compromise could be to have long compliance 
periods, but additional requirements for short-term submission of major parts of used emissions rights. 
Market interventions like safety valves or price limits must not be implemented, from an economics’ 
perspective, because they prevent the optimal allocation of emission rights and abatement measures, 
thus increasing costs. In addition, if additional emission allowances are handed out, when a certain 
price level is reached, and if these extra allowances are not ex ante included in the cap, ecological 
effectiveness as well as inter-generational justice are endangered. However, price limits may apply 
when intra-generational justice is at stake. 
3.5 Monitoring and Penalties 
Sustainable carbon markets should include robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), reli-
able registries for emissions and allowances as well as rigorous penalties in case of non-compliance. 
In ETS, basically, the authority only has to check if emitters can compensate each and every unit of 
emissions by an emission allowance in its hold. This would guarantee that emissions at one point 
would be compensated by emission reductions at another point, which in turn would lead to total 
emissions below the cap. Thus, from an ecological, economic, and justice perspective, reliable moni-
toring is necessary in order to guarantee compliance with regulations, because only this would lead to 
real emission reductions, efficiency gains, and the protection of future generations while making the 
polluter pay. Necessary individual elements are monitoring procedures as well as a registries emis-
sions and allowances. In order to guarantee steady compliance and lower administrative costs, moni-
toring of emissions as well as allowance tracking should be reliable, continuous, and IT-based. Com-
pliance monitoring based on periodically (verified) emission reports, however, is more cost intensive 
and suffers a higher risk of fraud and less environmental certainty. If, however, the reporting and veri-
fication option is chosen, the authority has to assign this task to independent and competent verifiers. 
If at the end of a compliance period registries show a shortage of allowances, severe penalties have to 
apply for economic, ecological, and justice reasons. Penalties should act as an ex post punishment for 
breaching the law and they should ex ante discourage emitters from non-compliance. From an eco-
nomics’ point of view, penalties act as quasi prices, the payment of which may appear as a cheap 
compliance option to emitters. Thus, fines have to be significantly higher than the allowance price, e.g. 
double the average allowances price of the past compliance period. As the risk of non-compliance is 
determined by multiplying the fine and the probability of getting caught, both have to be sufficiently 
high. In addition, for ecological reasons, a shortage of allowances must be fully compensated not later 
than in the next compliance period in order to not endanger the cap. Justice reasoning emphasizes that 
all non-compliance by emitters should be equally and severely punished including ex post shortage 
compensation in order to fulfill inter-generational-justice and polluter-pays requirements. 17 
 
3.6 Additional Design Features 
Ambitious domestic ETS may suffer from leakage, if competitors do not use a comparably stringent 
policy  to  cope  with  GHG  emissions.  However,  leakage  can  be  prevented  by  different  strategies. 
Firstly, the domestic ETS could be made less stringent, a solution, which neither from the ecological 
nor from the economic or justice perspectives would be favorable. Secondly, major competitors on the 
world market, e.g. OECD countries, could design a common carbon market or interlink their domestic 
systems.  Ultimately,  if  other alternatives fail,  protective  measures  such  as  border  tax adjustments 
could be implemented on the domestic level. They would raise the prices for imported goods by charg-
ing a premium on imported products originating from countries with less stringent environmental reg-
ulations and thus adjust production costs. This would level the playing field for emitters covered by 
ambitious domestic ETS, which would be advisable from an economic (competitiveness) and social 
justice (equality, intra-generational international justice, inter-generational justice) point of view and 
could even prevent a global increase of emissions. 
4 Conclusions 
By defining and operationalizing the sustainability criteria of ecological effectiveness, economic effi-
ciency, and social justice for the application on GHG ETS, design recommendations for sustainable 
carbon markets shown in figure 3 can be derived. Surprisingly, ecological, economic, and justice-
based recommendations in many parts tend to point in the same direction. Thus, in designing sustaina-
ble carbon markets, major problems do not arise from contradictory demands by different sustainabili-
ty criteria. All criteria rather emphasize the need for a strict implementation of ambitious ETS with 
stringent absolute volume caps, comprehensive coverage, compulsory participation of all or at least 
major sources, auctioning of allowances, restricted use of temporal and geographic means to optimize 
on abatement costs (banking, borrowing, offsets), a smoothly working trading system, reliable MRV 
and severe penalties for non-compliance including ex post compensation of surplus emissions. 
However, carbon markets in existence do not fully comply with sustainability criteria. ETS in Japan, 
e.g., are voluntary and allow intensity targets (Rudolph/Park 2010), the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative suffers from a loose cap (Rudolph 2011), and even EU’s ETS is still waiting for major im-
provements to come after 2012 (Ellerman 2010). Reasons for that can be found in the political econo-
my of emissions trading (Rudolph 2005). Nevertheless, for future political debates on emerging ETS, 
political claims of sustainable carbon markets not being feasible, because economic, ecological and 
social justice requirements differ greatly and cannot be matched are proven to be ill-founded. Figure 3: Design Recommendations for sustainable Carbon Markets 
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